Statistical Methods Applicable to Bioterrorism Prevention and Damage Control

Abstract

The World Trade Center disaster of September 11, 2001 has dramatically raised the consciousness and awareness of the entire world to the threat of terrorism in everyday life. As a response to this act, the U.S. and other nations have directed considerable material and intellectual resources to the prevention of terrorist acts and, in anticipation that prevention may sometimes fail, to the control of damage resulting from such acts. This presentation highlights some areas of statistical sciences that have been used shortly after the 911 incidents which show great promise of future utility. In particular, we will discuss, in relation to the anthrax threat and the perceived threat of smallpox that occurred in 2001 and 2002, our investigations into the costs and utility of preventive surveillance measures (e.g., routine inspection of airline travelers, mailrooms, mass vs. focused immunization, etc.). We also report on the design and implementation of a survey that employed multimode and rapid response methodology to evaluate the efficacy of a program to immunize first-responders for smallpox. Again, in relation to smallpox immunization, we will discuss how game theory can be useful in evaluating possible strategies. We will conclude with a general discussion of syndromic surveillance, which is a measure likely to be widely used in the control of diseases spread by terrorist acts. In this discussion, we will draw analogies to disease cluster investigations.