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Seminars

Robust Traceability from Trace Amounts

  • 2016-05-10 (Tue.), 10:30 AM
  • Recreation Hall, 2F, Institute of Statistical Science
  • Prof. Salil Vadhan
  • Harvard University, on sabbatical at National Chiao-Tung University

Abstract

The privacy risks inherent in the release of a large number of summary statistics were illustrated by Homer et al. (PLoS Genetics, 2008), who considered the case of 1-way marginals of SNP allele frequencies obtained in a genome-wide association study: Given a large number of minor allele frequencies from a case group of individuals diagnosed with a particular disease, together with the genomic data of a single target individual and statistics from a sizable reference dataset independently drawn from the same population, an attacker can determine with high confidence whether or not the target is in the case group. In this work we describe and analyze a simple attack that succeeds even if the summary statistics are significantly distorted, whether due to measurement error or noise intentionally introduced to protect privacy. Our attack only requires that the vector of distorted summary statistics is close to the vector of true marginals in L1 norm. Moreover, the reference pool required by previous attacks can be replaced by a single sample drawn from the underlying population. The new attack, which is not specific to genomics and which handles Gaussian as well as Bernoulli data, significantly generalizes recent lower bounds on the noise needed to ensure differential privacy (Bun, Ullman, and Vadhan, STOC 2014; Steinke and Ullman, 2015), obviating the need for the attacker to control the exact distribution of the data. Joint work with Cynthia Dwork, Adam D. Smith, Thomas Steinke, and Jon Ullman.

Update:2024-12-10 15:30
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